Contract farming is a growing practice in developing countries and first-world economies, alike. It generates necessary guarantees to sustain the continued operations of vulnerable farmers while enabling the manufacturers to manage the aggregate supply and price risk. We consider a single manufacturer who owns several manufacturing plants, each with a random demand for the crop. The manufacturer selects a set of farmers to offer a menu of contracts, which is exogenously specified or endogenously determined. Each "selected" farmer chooses a contract from this menu in advance of the growing season. After the growing season, under known demands and supplies, the manufacturer minimizes the distribution costs from the selected farmers to the production facilities. We formulate this problem as a Stackelberg game with asymmetric information, where the manufacturer is the leader and the farmers are followers. The manufacturer's problem is a two-stage stochastic planning program for which we develop two solution approaches. We have applied our model to problem instances anchored on data from a large manufacturer of potato chips contracting with thousands of small farmers in India. We report on the performance of the solution methods compared to a lower bound based on the Lagrangean dual of the problem and show that the optimality gap is below 1%, for problem instances with 1,000 potential farmers. We also show how our model can be used to gain managerial insights.
Introduction and Summary
Contract farming is an emerging practice in developing countries such as India, Brazil, and Turkey.
Food processing companies, hereafter referred to as manufacturers, contract with a large number of relatively small and financially challenged farmers. The industry distinguishes between two types of contracts: under production contracts, the buyer owns the product while it is being produced and the farmer is compensated for the services he provides; in a marketing contract, the farmer maintains ownership over the crops but, in its simplest form, the manufacturer guarantees to buy (up to) a given quantity of the farmer's crop in a season, for a set guaranteed price. In this paper, we confine ourselves to marketing contracts.
A typical manufacturer contracts with hundreds or thousands of farmers. These farmers are dispersed across different regions, often with vastly different climate and soil conditions and water supplies; their farm size varies greatly, see e.g. Table 1 in Singh et al. (2002) , partitioning farms in India into five categories: submarginal, marginal, small, medium, and large farms. (Table A .1 in (sufficient) supplies that conform with them. McDonald et al. (2004, p. 29) state, for example, that "most fresh market lettuce and virtually all processed vegetables are grown under contracts specifying . . . seed stock, fertilizers, chemical inputs, and product qualities." see ibid. for other examples among meat products and a general overview of the practice of contract farming and the rationales behind it. The contracts also enable the buyer to provide equipment and raw materials to the typically cash-strapped farmers. Finally, quality inspections are hard to perform in the context of spot market transactions, but naturally built into the farm contracts. MacDonald et al. (2004) Thus, contract farming is a novel supply chain arrangement that benefits all parties. In particular, it generates necessary guarantees to sustain the continued operations of very vulnerable suppliers (farmers) -a major socio-economic goal for developing countries.
Moreover, contract farming is a common and growing trend in first-world countries as well. It covered no less than 39% of US agricultural production in 2008, the last year for which official statistics seem to be available. This compares with 11% in 1969 and 28% in 1991 , see MacDonald and Korb (2011 . (These percentages refer to the aggregate of production and marketing contracts.)
Contract farming is more widely used for some products as compared to others. (For example, MacDonald and Korb (2011) report that, no less than 90% of sugar beet and tobacco production was conducted via contract farming, while the percentages for corn, soybeans, and wheat were close to the 25% mark, see Table A .2 in Appendix A. Most strikingly, however, contract farming is a growing trend for each of these crops, exhibiting an increase by at least 10 percentage points in the first eight years of this century.) Farmers are exposed to production risks resulting from droughts, frost, hail, diseases, and insect infestations, among other unusual events. Clearly, like their brethren in emerging countries, American farmers are exposed to the above often severe volatility in commodity prices on the spot market, providing an additional major incentive for contract farming with large buyers.
However, as with all innovative design mechanisms in supply chains, the devil is in the tactical details. To ensure an adequate supply of the crops, how many farmers should the manufacturer contract with? How should specific farmers be selected? What is the impact of the offered menu of price-quantity contracts and how should the menu be chosen? If the manufacturer has a network of production facilities, which farmers should supply which of these facilities?
To answer these interdependent questions, we analyze the following model and develop effective solution methods: There is a single manufacturer who owns several manufacturing plants, each with a specific, albeit random demand for the crop. The manufacturer incurs two types of cost: procurement and distribution costs. She offers a specific menu of contracts to a selected set of farmers in advance of the growing season. A contract specifies the unit price and quantity (among other terms and specifications). The actual purchase amount is the minimum of the committed quantity and the realized yield. Each "selected" farmer chooses a contract from this menu which results in the highest expected profits for him, among those that satisfy certain participation or risk aversion constraints, if any. Our model assumes that the water supply is the primary random factor affecting a farmer's total yield. This assumption is appropriate for countries like India and Brazil. However, with minor adjustments, the model can be applied to other -or multiple-yield risk factors.
During the season, various random factors become known: first, the rainfall and the well capacity of each of the farmers become revealed. Thereafter, each contracted farmer determines how much water to draw from an accessible but capacitated well (if available). This, in turn, determines the farmer's total yield, a (non-linear) deterministic function of the combined water supply the farmer acquires from his rainfall, surface water and well water sources. Second, each manufacturing plant observes, by the end of the season, its product demand. At that point, the manufacturer determines an optimal distribution plan to supply its plants from the contracted farmers, drawing from the spot market or an external source in case of a nationwide shortage of farmers' supplies.
In selecting how many and what specific collection of farmers to contract with, the manufacturer wishes to minimize expected aggregate costs subject to ensuring, with a given high likelihood, that the nationwide aggregate supply matches or exceeds aggregate nationwide demand. We refer to this probabilistic constraint as the coverage constraint. The importance of this constraint follows from the fact that, for all the reasons outlined above, the manufacturer cannot or does not wish to rely on the spot market as a supply source other than as a rare emergency backup solution, at worst, to be used for a small part of the overall supply.
We formulate this problem as a Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer is the leader and the farmers are followers. The manufacturer has imperfect knowledge of part of the parameters in the distributions that describe the farmers. In other words, some of the farmers' information is private, giving rise to a game with asymmetric information.
As to the farmers, they only need to know the parameters pertaining to their own farm, the local rainfall and well capacity distribution included. Moreover, they only need to decide whether to contract with the manufacturer, and, if so, which of the contracts to select. As mentioned, contract farming is pervasive in first-world economies, such as the United States. In developing countries, the farmer's selection problem may be challenging, but various NGO's and government agencies have been emerged to assist farmers with their contract decisions. An example is SNV, working together with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations; see e.g., Sango et al. (2016) reporting on their contract farming support program in Zimbabwe.
In our base model, the menu of contracts is exogenously specified, in the sense that the (unit price, quantity) pairs are assumed to be given. (A different menu may be offered in different regions and to farmers of different land sizes.) However, we also show how the manufacturer may choose the menu of contracts, endogenously, along with her other decision elements, so as to minimize her expected costs.
Even for a given menu of contracts, the manufacturer's problem resulting from the farmers' best responses to the offered menu is a complex two-stage stochastic program: she first has to select the set of farmers to work with in the upcoming growing season, and after the growing season, under known demands and supplies, she determines the distribution plan from the selected farmers to the production facilities; this to minimize the aggregate of the expected procurement and distribution
costs. An important feature of this two-stage stochastic program is the aforementioned coverage constraint. As mentioned, we also show how an optimal menu of contracts may be selected along with the manufacturer's remaining decision elements. In doing so, we follow a standard paradigm in contract theory, see e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) or Lovejoy (2006) .
Under a given menu of contracts, the manufacturer's two-stage stochastic planning problemincorporating the farmers' best response functions -may be formulated as that of minimizing a supermodular set function subject to the above coverage constraint as a single side constraint. In other words, we view the outcome of the stochastic program as a function of the set of selected farmers. A set function is supermodular if the cost savings resulting from the addition of a given farmer decrease when this farmer is added to a larger collection of farmers. We develop two algorithmic approaches to solve the manufacturer's problem, as well as a lower bound for the optimal cost value, based on the Lagrangean dual resulting from the Lagrangean relaxation of a pair of quadratic constraints that are equivalent to the above probabilistic coverage constraint.
We have applied our model to problem instances that are calibrated to data from a large manufacturer of potato chips contracting with thousands of small potato farmers in India. We report on the performance of the heuristics and lower bounds and show that the optimality gap is only a few percentage points. This means that the heuristics are indeed close to optimal and the lower bounds are close to exact. The CPU time for the asymptotically fastest of the heuristics, implemented on a standard laptop platform is, in general, less than several CPU minutes even when addressing problems with one thousand potential farmers. We also report on various qualitative insights arising from the numerical study, and show how our model can be used to evaluate different contract menus.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature.
Section 3 develops our model and formulates it as a Stackelberg game. Section 4 characterizes the solution to the farmers' optimization problem in response to the offered menu of contracts. Section 5 shows how the choice of the menu of contracts may be endogenously determined. Incorporating the farmers' best responses, one generates the manufacturer's resulting optimization problem, as mentioned, a complex two-stage stochastic program. Section 6 reports on a large scale numerical study, which is anchored on data provided by an international potato chips manufacturer, contracting with Indian farmers and manufacturing in three plants, there. Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion of generalizations of our model.
Literature Review
This paper contributes to the recent literature on supplier selection and diversification. Almost all of this literature has been motivated by industrial or public health applications. The initial literature on procurement problems under random yields confined itself to models with a single, albeit unreliable supplier. See Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak (2004) There are a few papers with endogenously determined yield distributions, in particular: Liu et al.
(2010) consider a newsvendor model and a single supplier with a stochastically proportional yield; the authors investigate the impact of improving the yield factor distribution and replacing it by a stochastically superior one. Federgruen and Yang (2009) address yield factor distributions that are endogenously determined by any number of suppliers as part of a competition game. Wang et al. (2010) assume, within a two-supplier random capacity model, that the suppliers' capacity loss distributions may be controlled by selecting an effort level from a continuous spectrum. In a two-stage process, the purchasing firm first decides how much effort to invest to improve the capacity loss distribution of both suppliers; after observing whether these efforts have succeeded, the purchasing firm decides on order quantities to cover a single season demand volume.
Our model differentiates itself from the above existing literature, by addressing several important complications and generalizations: (i) each farmer/supplier is offered a menu of possible contracts rather than a single order quantity at a single per unit cost price; (ii) after selecting a target delivery quantity from the menu, the farmer can, at least partially, control what fraction thereof is generated and sold to the buyer, by selecting the water supply from accessible wells to complement his random rainfall (and surface water, if applicable); (iii) rather than servicing a single location with random demand, we consider settings where random demands occur at an arbitrary number of locations, and the purchased supply quantities need to be distributed to these demand points so as to minimize aggregate distribution costs. Another important distinction in the contract farming context is that the number of potential (and actually retained) suppliers is in the hundreds or thousands, while in the above industrial applications, the number of potential suppliers is typically below 10. The qualitative implication of this distinction is that, in our context, supplier selection cannot be undertaken by a brute force enumeration of all possible sets of suppliers. At the same time, our model addresses a single season, while several of the above papers deal with models with multiple procurement opportunities and inventories carried from one period to the next.
As mentioned, yield uncertainty is pervasive in agriculture. See Lowe and Preckel (2004) for a survey of models for crop planning under yield uncertainty. Kazaz (2004) and Kazaz and Webster (2011) analyze models in which a food processing company has a single farmer/supplier, from whom a given amount of land is leased, an exogenously determined random fraction of which results in usable fruit supply. These studies thus employ the above "stochastically proportional yield model".
After the actual fruit supply becomes known, the food processing company has several options to complement this supply or to sell part of the supply on the fruit commodity market. Earlier papers by Jones et al. (2001 Jones et al. ( , 2002 Jones et al. ( , 2003 and Maatman et al. (2002) had shown how multiple production opportunities, again with a single supply source and a single demand destination, can mitigate the risk associated with yield uncertainty. Tan and Çömden (2012) present a planning methodology for a manufacturer wanting to match the random supply of premium fruits and vegetables with the random retailer demand for a given set of contracted farms, operating under a given price contract.
Several papers have addressed procurement strategies for food processors. Devalkar et al. (2011) consider a multi-period setting in which the manufacturer procures its input commodity entirely from the spot market where it is subject to a spot price process which is stochastic but of a known distributional form. The authors were motivated by ITC, one of India's largest private sector food processing companies, and its procurement of soybeans for the production of soybean oil and meal.
Since all inputs are purchased on the spot market, the Devalkar et al. (2011) model does not involve the selection of supply sources and associated contracts and the paper does not need to contend with yield uncertainty and distribution costs, as in our model addressing contract farming. Similar to our paper, Chaturvedi and de Albeniz (2011) consider a supplier selection problem for a manufacturer, where the suppliers face uncertain yields and there is information asymmetry between the manufacturer and the suppliers. However, the yield uncertainty is assumed to be of a binary nature: either the supplier succeeds in delivering the full order size, or he delivers nothing. This representation of the yield factor does not fit the farmers' yield uncertainty, where it varies continuously and depends, in an intricate manner, on the rainfall and other sources of water supply.
Rather than ensuring, with a coverage chance constraint, that the total supply covers a total random demand volume, the authors assume that the manufacturer wishes to maximize the expected value of a concave increasing function of the realized supply. Moreover, in Chaturvedi and de Albeniz (2011) only the aggregate realized supply matters, while in our model, given the importance of distribution costs, its geographic dispersion across the country is of essential importance as well.
Until recently, the literature on contract farming, per se, was confined to empirical and case studies, see Runsten and Key (1996) and Warning and Key (2002) . Boyabatli et al. (2011 ), Huh et al. (2012 , and Huh and Lall (2013) appear to be the first analytical models addressing contract farming. Boyabatli et al. (2011) assume that the manufacturer may procure her input commodity either from upfront contracts or from the end-of-the-season spot market; both sources are viewed as equally desirable except for possible price differentials. The demand volume is deterministically given. The (uniform) unit contract price is linearly dependent on the end-of-the-season spot price, however with an upper and lower bound cap. (This is apparently a common practice in the beef industry.) The quantity bought in an upfront contract is assumed to become available without any yield uncertainty. Huh and Lall (2013) endogenize the stochastic yield rate by incorporating irrigation decisions under rainfall uncertainty, similar to our treatment of the farmers' yield. Their model considers a single farmer producing for a single market, who can allocate his land among several possible crops, with uncertain commodity prices. A forward contract is offered to the farmer for a subset of the possible crops. Similarly, Huh et al. (2012) address contract farming by a single location manufacturer who has access to a pool of identical local farmers, all experiencing the exact same rainfall per acre; as opposed to a single farmer. Finally, Mendelson and Tunca (2007) is an example of a supply chain model in which the agents can use the spot market as an alternative outlet to buy or sell items; see the references therein.
The Model
The manufacturer starts by selecting the set of farmers to contract with, from a set of I potential farmers, who are differentiated by their geographical location, their probability distributions of seasonal rainfall (and surface water, if applicable), their local well capacity as well as production cost and efficiency parameters. Information is asymmetric in the sense that some of the parameters describing these probability distributions, or cost and efficiency parameters are privately known to the farmer, and only distributionally known to the manufacturer.
Each of the selected farmers follows by choosing a contract from a given menu of contracts.
The menu may be exogenously specified, or it may be designed by the manufacturer. A contract specifies the guaranteed unit price the manufacturer commits herself to pay per unit of supply, as well as the corresponding quantity the manufacturer will buy at the end of the season, of course capped by the supply the farmer is able to generate. Typically, a contract with a larger quantity commitment comes with a lower per unit price, thus generating a challenging trade-off for the farmer: if he chooses a contract with a low quantity volume, but higher per unit price, there is a significant chance of oversupply, the excess of which may be sold at the spot market at an uncertain and typically lower price. Conversely, if he selects a contract with a higher quantity volume, the risk of oversupply is reduced, but so is the profit margin. The menu includes the "no-supply option" which is selected when the maximum expected profit among all offered supply contracts falls below a given minimum participation threshold (or when all contracts violate a risk aversion constraint).
When evaluating a contract, the farmer takes into account how rainfall and surface water can optimally be supplemented with well water, once uncertainty about the rainfall and well capacity have been revealed.
The best response of each farmer to the offered menu of contracts generates a distribution of his supply, were he to be selected, along with the contract choice and associated price-quantity combination. In assessing the supply quantity that would be obtained when selecting any given farmer, the manufacturer faces two sources of uncertainty: first, the farmer, himself, faces a volatile supply quantity due to the intrinsic randomness of various factors (rainfall, well capacity, etc.) determining the yield. The manufacturer's uncertainty is further compounded by the fact that, as mentioned earlier, she has incomplete, i.e., only distributional information regarding some of the farmers' parameters. Thus, the manufacturer faces a mixture of the possible supply random variables that prevail under given values for the uncertain farmer parameters.
The manufacturer selects a set of farmers to contract with, in order to assure, with a high likelihood, that the aggregate supply is sufficient to cover the aggregate demand which arises at the end of the season at the different manufacturing facilities. Since both the farmers' supplies and the facilities' demands are random, it may not be possible to fully guarantee this; instead, we specify, as a constraint, that the likelihood of sufficient coverage be at least equal to a given probability, say 95%. (More generally, one may want to trace out the optimal cost -coverage efficient frontier.) This coverage constraint plays a fundamental role in the manufacturer's problem. The manufacturer, typically, needs to secure its supplies from contract farming, for all the various reasons listed in the Introduction. In particular, spot market prices are highly volatile and there are no or very limited instruments available to hedge against the price volatility. Most importantly, manufacturers typically request tight product and quality specifications which cannot be found in the spot market, but can be built into the farmers' contracts. Quality inspections on the spot market are typically difficult and come with high transaction costs. Thus, the spot market is typically only used to cover limited shortages -with imperfect products-in the rare scenarios permitted by the probabilistic coverage constraint.
In selecting the set of farmers, the manufacturer aims to minimize along with the expected procurement costs, the expected distribution costs between the farmers and the production facilities.
Since the optimal distribution plan can be determined after the supply and demand realizations are observed, the manufacturer faces a two-stage stochastic program, incorporating the farmers' best responses to the offered menu of contracts: in the first stage, the farmers are selected; in the second stage, the distribution plan is determined. We assume that the distribution costs are linear in the shipment volumes between the farmers and the facilities. This assumption is satisfied when the shipments either (i) are made in full truckloads, or (ii) are carried out by outside shipping companies. (In our application described in Section 6, both assumptions are satisfied.) Distribution costs often represent a major component of aggregate costs. (In our application, they amounted to at least one third of aggregate costs.) As a consequence, the geographic location of each potential supplier is an important selection criterion, along with many others.
We complete this model section with a formulation of the manufacturer's two-stage stochastic program arising under a given menu of contracts. In Section 5, we describe how the design of an optimal menu of contracts can be integrated with this planning problem. We use the subscript i (j) to distinguish among the I farmers (J manufacturing plants). Subscript i = 0 refers to the spot market (or an alternative emergency source, e.g. an import from a different country), assumed to have an ample supply source S 0 .
Parameters and Input Variables:
• D j = the (random) demand at manufacturing plant j, j = 1, . . . , J
the aggregate (random) demand among all manufacturing facilities, with mean µ tot and standard deviation σ tot
• S i = the (random) supply of farmer i, if selected, resulting from that farmer's best response to the offered menu of contracts, i = 1, . . . , I
• v i = the expected payment to farmer i, if selected, i = 1, . . . , I
• γ ij = the distribution cost per unit of crop, dispatched from farmer i to manufacturing facility j, i = 1, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J
• γ 0j = the (random) purchase, transaction and distribution cost per unit, obtained at the spot market (or emergency source) and shipped to facility j, j = 1, . . . , J • = the maximum permitted probability of an aggregate shortfall at the end of the season The distributions of the demand variables {D j } are inputs to the model. The random variables {S i } and parameters {v i } are to be derived from the solution of the farmers' best response problems, as described at the end of Section 4. The distribution cost parameters {γ ij , i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , J} are deterministic cost coefficients, which are inputs to the model. In contrast, the parameters {γ 0j , j = 1, . . . , J} are random at the first stage of the stochastic program since they involve the end-of-the-season spot price of the commodity. In Appendix B, we discuss several approaches to derive a probability distribution for the latter.
Decision Variables:
• Y i = 1 if farmer i is selected, i = 1, . . . , I; and 0, otherwise; Y 0 = 1
• ν ij = the volume shipped from source i to manufacturing plant j, i = 0, . . . , I and j = 1, . . . , J The manufacturer's two-stage stochastic program may be formulated as:
where the recourse function Ψ(Y ) is defined as
In the above formulation, it is assumed that any excess in the aggregate supply beyond the aggregate demand, has no salvage value. In Section 7, we show our analyses can be adapted to allow for such salvage opportunities, via the spot market or other channels. (Similarly, fixed transaction costs per farmer could be added to the model, without any additional complexity; such fixed costs are simply added to the coefficients in the first term of (1).)
In our base model, we assume that the farmers' rainfall variables, and hence the {S i } variables are independent of each other, as well as from the aggregate demand variable D tot or the future spot price. Clearly, seasonal rainfall quantities are correlated, in particular among farmers in the same general region as well as with the future spot price. In Section 7, we therefore show how our results can be generalized to allow for such interdependences. Our independence assumption impacts only the specification of the coverage constraint (2). In evaluating the second term in the objective function (1), an arbitrary joint distribution of the random variables {S i , D j , γ 0j } may be employed.
To appreciate the complexity of the manufacturer's problem (M ), it is useful to consider a greatly simplified (yet still NP-hard) version in which all of the manufacturer's decisions may be made under perfect information about all random variables, i.e., the supply volumes {S i } and the demand levels {D j }. This perfect information case is covered in Appendix C.
The coverage constraint, while essential, adds a significant complication to the farmer selection problem. Note that even a single test whether a given set of farmers, i.e., a given vector Y , satisfies the constraint is very complex and time consuming: it involves the calculation of the convolution of potentially hundreds or even thousands of random variables, each with a complicated distribution, to be determined by an extensive simulation study; see the discussion at the end of Section 4. Since the coverage constraint involves the tail behavior of the aggregate supply, accurate estimates of the complex distribution of each of the farmers' supply variables are needed, extending the required length of the underlying simulation studies, in a major way.
Instead, we show that the coverage constraint (2) may be approximated closely by one in which only the first two moments of the random variables {S i } and D tot are needed. More specifically, we replace constraint (2) by:
where
and with Φ(.) the cdf of the standard Normal distribution. This substitution is justified by the following Central Limit Theorem result (proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix D):
It is well known that the Normal distribution provides a very good approximation for sums of independent random variables, even when the number of variables is modest (say, 10). In our setting, the number of farmers I is in the hundreds or thousands, so the Normal approximation is virtually exact.
Let z be equal to Φ −1 (1 − ). Federgruen and Yang (2008) show that constraint (4) may be replaced by a set of three linear or quadratic constraints. The manufacturer's problem may thus be formulated as:
The Farmer's Best Response Strategy
In any given season, each farmer's yield is random, primarily because of volatility in the water supply. (It is easy to adjust our model and analysis when there are additional or alternative random yield factors.) The latter consists of natural rainfall and surface water, possibly complemented with irrigation water, drawn from a well, if available. Water supply is the primary random yield factor for many crops and in many countries; see e.g., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2007). Relevant crops include rice, maize, cotton, soybean and potatoes; see e.g. Dawande et al. (2013) and Palma (2004) . While the problem is particularly severe in developing countries such as India, many African countries, China and Mexico, it arises in first-world economies as well.
In many developing countries, the farmers may face a third source of uncertainty beyond the season's rainfall and his well capacity: even the availability of an electricity source to enable irrigation from the well may be uncertain; when unavailable, the water may need to be pumped with higher diesel costs. The water volume to be drawn from the well may be determined after the season's actual rainfall and surface water quantity, the well capacity, and the availability of an electricity source become known. Food and of the United Nations (2007) Each farmer is offered a menu of L contracts, indexed by a subscript , where a contract specifies a unit price and an associated potential purchase quantity by the manufacturer. The actual purchase quantity is the lesser of the potential quantity and the realized yield. If the realized yield at the end of the season exceeds the potential purchase quantity, the farmer can possibly sell the excess quantity on the spot market, where the unit price is (highly) random.
In this section, we analyze the farmer's best response problem to a given menu of contracts. In the next section, we show how the best response problem can be used in the design of an optimal menu of contracts, following the standard paradigm in contract theory, see e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) or Lovejoy (2006) .
We mentioned, in the Introduction, that it is very difficult to predict the spot price several months or a year ahead of the computation. Moreover, farmers, particularly small farmers in developing countries, can ill afford to take significant risks with their livelihood. When considering the spot market as an outlet for any excess supplies, we therefore assume that the farmer considers a safe lower bound for next year's spot price. (This lower bound may be based on recent price behavior and media based information as to expectations.) However, more sophisticated farming companies may use the actual predicted distribution of the spot price, in lieu of this lower bound.
The farmer's problem is specified by the following list of notations.
Parameters and Input Variables for Each Farmer i = 1, . . . , I:
• R i : the random rainfall and surface water, in cubic meters, at farmer i, with cdf G i (·)
• C i : the random capacity of farmer i's well, in cubic meters
• S i : farmer i's random sales volume to the manufacturer • π i : farmer i's minimally acceptable profit level, to be met with a minimum likelihood (1 − i )
• p : the per unit purchase price associated with contract , = 1, . . . , L
• q : the potential purchase quantity associated with contract , = 1, . . . , L
• p s i
: the (lower bound) spot price considered by farmer i
• c i : farmer i's variable production cost, exclusive of irrigation cost
: farmer i's cost of drawing one cubic meter of water from the well ∈ {δ
is the cost rate when an electricity source is available, δ H i is the higher cost rate in the alternative case) We assume that each of the farmer's parameters {π i , c i , δ 
Decision Variables:
• x i : the water volume, in cubic meters, drawn from farmer i's well, if available, i = 1, . . . , I
• Z i = 1 if farmer i chooses contract , i = 1, . . . , I and = 1, . . . , L; and 0 otherwise X i , farmer i's yield, is a (non-linear) function of his aggregate water supply, i.e.,
where α i denotes a parameter that is privately known to the farmer, but not to the manufacturer.
The latter has a prior distribution for the parameter value, with cdf F i (·). For notational simplicity, we assume that the information asymmetry pertains to a single parameter α i . Generalizations to settings where multiple parameters in the yield function f i (·, ·) are privately known, can be readily accommodated.
We make the following assumption regarding the shape of the yield function.
The following are four examples of yield functions that satisfy Assumption 1. In our numerical studies, we have used the first of the four structures.
Structure 1: α i represents the ideal yield under optimal water supply conditions. The actual (random) yield X i is a linear function of the shortfall of the water supply vis-a-vis an ideal water quantity W i , i.e.,
Structure 2: Identical to Structure 1, except that the yield declines (linearly) if the water supply is in excess of the ideal water quantity W i , i.e.,
Structure 3: Identical to Structure 1, except that the maximum yield α i is maintained as long as the aggregate water supply is between W i and W i , and declines linearly thereafter, i.e.,
Structure 4: This structure has been suggested in the agricultural literature for the relationship between crop yields and water supply, see e.g., Christensen and McElyea (1988) , Rao et al. (1990), and Palma (2004) . See Dawande et al. (2013) for a recent operations management paper employing the same relationship:
Equation (11) represents X i , the farmer i's yield, as a function of the aggregate of the seasonwide rainfall (and surface water, if applicable), and the season-wide water volume drawn from a well. In reality, X i may depend on the aggregate of the daily shortfalls and surpluses vis-a-vis an ideal daily water quantity, and therefore depend on the stochastic process of daily rainfalls.
(Unfortunately, days with an excess of water supply above and beyond the required target volume do not compensate for days with a shortfall.) More specifically, let R it be the rainfall during day t at farmer i and assume the growing season consists of T days, numbered t = 1, . . . , T . Then, under Structure 1, for example, the yield equation (12) should be replaced by
Many stochastic processes have been proposed to represent the rainfall process {R it }, see e.g., Waymire and Gupta (1981) and Rodriguez-Iturbe et al. (1987) . While we will proceed with the aggregate yield model (11), its replacement by (16) (or other yield models based on the daily rainfall process) is easily accommodated, with minor adjustments to the farmer's best response problem in this section, only.
Beyond (11), the following relationship prevails:
Each farmer i's best response problem may be formulated as the following two-stage stochastic
) denote the random profit earned by farmer i when choosing contract :
In other words, we formulate the farmer's problem as selecting the contract which maximizes his expected profits subject to a risk aversion constraint. For the latter, we choose a maximum probability i with which the farmer's profits fall below the minimum profit level π i . Constraint (21) may be replaced or complemented with an upper bound on the standard deviation of the profit level
) or any other risk measure. We now show how, for any of the contracts = 1, . . . , L, the profit value
Recall that the farmer has full knowledge of the parameters in (18), including the structural form of the function f i (α i , ·).
is concave, hence differentiable in T i everywhere, with the possible exception of a countable set of values, where, in any case, the left and right hand partial derivatives
and note that the optimization problem (18) can be written as
Lemma 2. Assume the yield function f i (·, ·) satisfies Assumption 1.
(a) Let T * i (α i , R i ) denote the smallest optimizer of (22b). Then
is strictly increasing and differentiable in T i , then T * i (α i , R i ) may be determined as follows: Let t * i (α i , q ) denote the water supply quantity which generates a yield equal to the contract volume q , i.e., t * i (α i , q ) is the unique root of the equation
If t *
Lemma 2(d) provides an analytical characterization of T * i (α i , R i ), the farmer's optimal total water supply when adopting contract from the menu, and given a rainfall value R i . This optimal water supply value is either given as a constant or as the unique root of a simple monotone function. The most general case where f i (α i , ·) may fail to be increasing or differentiable everywhere, can be handled analogously, except that more cases need to be distinguished. Note also that the dependence of T * i on q is very simple: ∂T * i /∂q = 0 in all but case (I)(vi) where it is given by the simple expression in (24).
The expected profit under each of the L contracts, as well as the likelihood of this profit value meeting the minimum level π i , can thus be evaluated by unconditioning over the joint distribution of the natural rainfall (and surface water, if applicable), the well capacity, and a binary variable indicating whether a local electricity source is available. The farmer then chooses, among all contracts which satisfy the specified risk bound, the one with the highest expected profit value. (If none of the contracts are feasible, farmer i rejects the complete menu of contracts.) Under the optimal contract, the distribution of the supply quantity S i (α i ) can be evaluated, most simply, by generating a sample of K realizations from the above joint distribution of the random variables.
We conclude this section with a specification of the random variables {S i } and the expected payment values {v i } which are required for the specification of the manufacturer's problem (1)-(3):
The {S i } variables can be constructed as a mixture of the {S i (α i )} variables above, with the cdf F i as the mixing distribution. Finally,
with p α (i) the unit price in farmer i's optimal contract, assuming farmer i faces a specific parameter (vector) α i .
It is clear that, under asymmetric information, the supply variables are more volatile than when information is symmetric. It stands to reason that this results in a larger pool of contracted farmers and a larger expected aggregate supply value, since informational uncertainty now compounds on the intrinsic supply and demand risks. Our numerical studies confirm this conjecture.
Selecting the Menu of Contracts
In the previous section, we analyzed the farmer's best response problem to an exogenously given menu of contracts. In this section, we show how this menu of contracts may be selected endogenously by the manufacturer. In doing so, we follow a standard paradigm in contract theory, see e.g., Bolton
and Dewatripont (2005) or Lovejoy (2006) , however applied to a complex operations setting.
Typically, a single uniform menu needs to be offered to all farmers in a broad category, for example all farmers in a given state that are of medium size, say, see Table A .1 in Appendix A.
For notational simplicity only, we formulate the menu design problem assuming a single menu is offered to all farmers. The generalization to multiple menus -one offered to each of several broad categories of farmers-is straightforward.
Assume, therefore, that there are K types of farmers, differentiated by their privately known parameter value α i . In other words, there is a list of K α-values, α 1 < α 2 < . . . < α K , such that, for all i, α i = α k for some k. The manufacturer's prior knowledge about each farmer i's parameter value α i is captured by a discrete cdf F i (·) with support on {α 1 , . . . , α K }. A menu of K contracts {(p , q ) : = 1, . . . , K} is to be designed such that, in accordance with the revelation principle, farmers of type k are incentivized to select the k th contract. The K contracts are to be chosen on a decreasing curve p = P (q). Without loss of generality, the contracts are numbered such that
When specifying the menu design problem, we address a somewhat simplified version of the manufacturer's problem, where in the objective (1) of (M ) (or (7) of (M )) the second, distribution cost related term is omitted, as are any risk bounds in the farmer's problem, see (21). With the menu specified as the optimal solution to this design program, or otherwise, the manufacturer solves the complete integrated farmer selection and distribution planning problem based on the anticipated fully optimal contract choices of the farmers, using the methods described in Appendices E and F.
For the sake of notational simplicity, we treat the well capacities {C i } and the water drawing cost rates {δ T i } as deterministic.
An Iterative Approach to Select the Menu of Contracts
Treating the volume quantities {q 1 , . . . , q K } as decision variables, we respecify the manufacturer's problem (M ). Let
• U i ( |k, q): the expected profit value for farmer i assuming he is of type k and selects contract ; 1 ≤ k, ≤ K.
• E(S i |q): the expected supply volume for farmer i, i = 1, . . . , I, if selected.
• V ar(S i |q): the variance of the supply volume for farmer i, i = 1, . . . , I, if selected.
• v i (q): the expected payment to farmer i, i = 1, . . . , I, if selected.
Constraint set (32) represents each farmer's individual rationality constraints (IR) ensuring that his expected profit meets the minimum participation level. Constraint set (33) represents the incentive compatibility constraints (IC) ensuring that farmer i selects contract k if of type k.
The following are analytical expressions for the various quantities U i ( |k, q), E(S i |q), V ar(S i |q), and v i (q) required in the model formulation.
For notational simplicity, we assume, as in Lemma 2(d), that the yield functions f i (α i , T i ) are increasing and differentiable, so that the analytical characterization of the optimal aggregate water supply T * i (α i , R i ) provided there, can be employed. Since, under all yield functions,
and denotes the break-even rainfall quantity under which the optimal total water supply suffices to yield the contract value of contract .
In some contract design problems, it is possible to replace the full set of (IC) -incentive compatibility constraints (33)-by a subset of so-called "local IC constraints", where for any = 1, . . . , K only the constraints corresponding with the values = k + 1 and = k − 1 need to be incorporated, see e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) or Lovejoy (2006) .
This reduction of the set of IC-constraints would be possible if the maximand in the farmer's objective function (22a) were supermodular in (q , α i ). However, the maximand fails to be super-
The menu design problem (M cont ) is a highly non-linear mixed integer problem. The natural solution method is to alternate between
• (M q ) identifying the optimal set of farmers, i.e., the optimal Y -vector, for a given menu of contracts, i.e., a given q-vector, and
• (M Y ) identifying an optimal contract menu, i.e., an optimal q-vector, for a given set of selected farmers, i.e., a given Y -vector.
This iterative algorithm is guaranteed to converge in finitely many iterations; if completed till convergence, it generates an optimal solution.
Problem (M q ) is an integer problem, and a special case of the problem discussed in Appendices 
Numerical Analysis
We have applied our model to a large global manufacturer of potato chips contracting with thousands of potato farmers in India. More specifically, we have created a numerical study with instances that are anchored on data provided by the manufacturer, as well as data that are publicly available.
In Appendix G, we describe in detail how the problem instances were created. The exact numbers are withheld in order to preserve confidentiality.
We have evaluated problem instances with seven different values for the targeted total number of potential farmers I: I =50, 75, 100, 150, 250, 500, and 1,000. For each value of I, we have evaluated 20 problem instances by considering high and low demand scenarios at a coverage level of 95%
and 99%, i.e., = 0.05 and = 0.01, respectively: five problem instances were generated for each of the four demand level / coverage level combinations. In Table 1 , we report the performance of the greedy-add heuristic (version 1 -the other greedy heuristics were generally dominated by this
Greedy-Add procedure) and the mixed integer programming approach, described in Appendix E.2.
(We used 5e-4 as the relative M ILP gap -optimality-tolerance for the M ILP method and when solving the perfect information problem to determine the initial set of farmers in the greedy-add heuristic.) Table 1 reports the average of the performance measures across the five instances that were generated for each of the demand level / coverage level combinations. By computing the Lagrangean dual as described in Appendix F (and using a grid search for near-optimal Lagrange multipliers for slow converging problem instances), we assessed an upper bound for the optimality gap of the heuristic methods.
In Column 4, we report the average of the actual values of I in the problem instances, resulting from the above distribution procedure across the 19 districts. Column 5 reports the supply-demand ratio R 1 , defined as I i=1 E(S i ), the expected supply if all I farmers were contracted, divided by the expected aggregate country-wide demand of the manufacturer.
Columns 6-9 and 10-13 report four performance measures for the above two heuristic methods:
(a) the runtime in CPU seconds, (b) the number of farmers contracted, (c) the upper bound for the optimality gap, measured by using the Lagrangean dual as the lower bound, and (d) a supply / demand ratio R 2 , defined as (
We conclude that both solution methods are remarkably close to optimal and that the Lagrangean dual generates a remarkably close-to-accurate estimate of the optimal cost value. The average optimality gap for the Greedy-Add heuristic is 1.09% and that for the M ILP based method is 0.35%. Indeed, the latter performs uniformly better. Moreover, the worst case optimality gap across all scenarios is 5.02% for the Greedy-Add procedure and 1.53% for the M ILP based approach. Even more encouraging is the fact that the optimality gap decreases, with I, to zero, suggesting that both heuristics are asymptotically optimal. Clearly, the results also imply that the average accuracy gap of the Lagrangean dual based lower bound is no more than 0.35%, as well. The Greedy-Add heuristic is faster, when I < 250. When I = 250 or I = 500, the CPU times are comparable. However, for I = 1, 000, the M ILP method is significantly faster. Most importantly, even instances with I ∼ 1, 000 can be solved in a few CPU minutes.
The results show that with a modest number of suppliers (I = 50), the supply-to-demand ratio R 2 is approximately 1.23 when pursuing a coverage level of 99%. This indicates a need to target an expected supply 23% in excess of the expected aggregate demand. As can be expected, this safety margin decreases as the supply is diversified over a larger number of potential suppliers, but the decline is modest to R 2 = 1.22 when I = 1, 000. These safety margins can be expected to be significantly larger when, in contrast to our scenarios, there is more significant demand volatility, or as the degree of information asymmetry is larger. Clearly, the required safety margin is larger for scenarios with a coverage level of 99% as opposed to those with a coverage level of 95%. For the latter, the required safety margin varies between 17 and 15% as the number of potential farmers I is increased.
Impact of the Menu Design
We have generated a small second set of scenarios to illustrate how our model can be used to evaluate alternative contract menus and how the magnitude of various risk factors impacts the system performance. To this end, we used a base scenario targeting I = 150 potential farmers, this time assuming all farmers are small size farmers. (Because of the above described distribution procedure across the 19 districts, the actual number of potential suppliers I = 158.)
We first evaluated two sets of three state-specific contract menus, each. The first (second) set of menus offers five (three) contract options; the second set is obtained by eliminating the options with the second and fourth largest price, in each of the three menus. As in our primary numerical study, all contracts pertaining to the same menu are characterized by quantity-price pairs that lie on a line. See, however, below for a study where the contracts are positioned on a non-linear curve.
In each state, all six menus share the same central contract specified as (p s , 1.43q s ), analogous to the central contract choice in the large scale numerical study of Section 6. The lines representing the menus have a slope of -10/3, -5/3, and -2/3 and in each of the menus, the price-quantity pairs representing the different contracts are equidistant (as in our primary numerical study In the first segments of Tables 2, 3 and 4, we report various performance measures under each of the six sets of menus. In Table 2 , Columns 3 and 4 specify the number of selected farmers under each of the six menus. Columns 5 and 6 report on the expected total supply from the contracted farmers. The numbers within parentheses exhibit the R 2 ratio, i.e., how much safety supply needs to be built in to ensure that demand can be covered with a high, given likelihood. Note that across all six menus, approximately, an expected supply, roughly 16% higher than the expected demand The seventh and eighth columns specify the expected costs to the manufacturer under the six menus. Offering five contracts instead of three results in higher expected costs for the manufacturer up to 5% in this problem instance as the farmers are able to extract better rent from her; see Table   4 . These columns also reveal that the slope of the contract menu line, hence the price sensitivity with respect to quantity variations in the contract, has a significant impact on overall costs. Menu 3 allows for a 10% reduction in overall expected costs, compared to Menu 1, assuming the menu consists of five contract choices. Note that the cost saving parallels a smaller reduction in the optimal number of farmers to contract with.
The first segment of Table 3 displays how many farmers, out of the full set of potential farmers, opt for each of the contract options, under the six menus. As we move from Menu 1 to Menu 3, the price sensitivity of quantity variations in the contract diminishes. This induces more and more farmers to select higher quantity contracts, since the per unit price sacrifice in doing so, is progressively smaller. Indeed the contract choice distribution under Menu 1 (2) majorizes that under Menu 2 (3), both when the menus offer three or five contract options. This shift towards the lower unit price / higher volume contracts explains the above cost savings as we move from Menu 1 to Menu 2 and Menu 3. It also explains why the number of selected farmers can be reduced as we move from Menu 1 to Menu 3. This is enabled by the fact that the selected farmers choose higher quantity contracts, reducing the average per unit price and allowing the manufacturer to contract with fewer farmers.
For the same set of problem instances, we have also explored how the different performance measures are impacted by several risk factors. The second segments in Tables 2 -4 exhibit the performance measures when the standard deviations of the various rainfall distributions are tripled.
In Table 2 , the third segment exhibits the performance measures when the demand distributions at the plants see their volatility doubled, and the last segment when both risk factors are amplified.
Doubling the coefficient of variation of the demand distributions results in an approximately 13%
increase in the targeted expected aggregate supply, to continue to meet the coverage constraint. In other words, the safety supply needs to be doubled, with R 2 increasing from 1.16 to 1.31.
To enable this, the manufacturer needs to expand the supplier pool by a similar percentage.
Focusing on the most efficient menu, Menu 3, the increased demand volatility results in an even larger increase of the manufacturer cost. The farmers fail to be impacted by the increased demand volatility, since these distributions do not affect the farmers' problem; see problem (F ), (19)-(21).
On the other hand, increased volatility of the rainfall distributions impacts the manufacturer less severely (by about 4%), but results in very significant decreases of the farmers' expected profits, yields and supplies.
To hold the cost increase to no more than 4%, it becomes optimal to expand the contracted farmer pool by some 14%, under the most cost efficient Menu 3. In other words, it is optimal for the manufacturer to face the increased risks, whether supply or demand risks, by diversifying the supply over a significantly expanded supplier pool.
When the volatility of both the rainfall and demand distributions is increased simultaneously, the above effects are compounded. Compared with the base case, the expected minimal cost for the manufacturer, under Menu 3, now increases by more than 20%, and the required number of contracted farmers grows from 114 to 147. Under Menu 1, it becomes necessary to select all but one of the farmers, when the menu offers five contract choices. When it offers only three, the coverage constraint cannot be met even when contracting with all of the farmers. When comparing among the six menus, we note that the above described patterns for the base case carry over to the second, third and fourth segments of Table 2 .
We have also experimented with contract menus in which the quantity -price pairs lie on a non-linear curve. To this end, we have adapted the three menu lines to parabolas which share the same midpoint and tangent of that midpoint. Table A .4 in Appendix A exhibits the contracts under each of the three menus, in each of the six states. In Table A In other words, instead of using five arbitrary and exogenously given contracts on the menu line, we determine the optimal combination of contracts by solving the mathematical program (M cont ).
For this experiment, we also incorporated the spot market option for the farmers' excess yields by choosing a state specific (lower bound) spot market price, p s i
, in the farmer's problem (F ) as roughly 10% higher than the associated variable cost, c i . In terms of the individual rationality constraints (IR) in (32), we selected the minimum expected profit levels for each of the five types as follows: starting with the type-1 farmers (with the stochastically smallest yield distributions), we selected a minimum profit level below the maximum achievable profit (under any contract on the menu line). After specifying the minimum profit level for type i, i = 1, . . . , 4, we selected a minimum profit level for type i + 1, above that of type i, but below its maximum achievable profit level, see Figure A .1 in Appendix A. Table 5 displays the the minimum profit levels and optimal contract quantities for all five types in each of the 18 districts. Note that in many cases the optimal solution uses less than five distinct points; however instances with five distinct contract pairs do arise, see Table 6 .
Finally, we have explored how increased volatility of the rainfall and demand distributions impacts the optimal menu choices and associated expected manufacturer's cost and average profit level of the farmers. We report the results in Table 6 Table 5 Minimally acceptable profits and the associated optimal contract quantities for five types of farmers in each district volatility benefits the manufacturer resulting in a (modest) cost saving, because the farmers can now be induced to accept higher quantity values, and hence lower prices (for all but one of the farmer types). The reason for this upward shift of the contract volume is that, in order to continue to meet the minimum expected profit level, all but one type of farmers need a higher contract volume to take advantage of better than average yields. Increased rainfall volatilities do result in the farmers being worse off, but the average profit reduction is strongly mitigated by the upward adjustments of the contract quantities. 
Conclusions and Generalizations
We have developed a tactical planning model for a manufacturer contracting with part of a general list of potential farmers as suppliers of a given agricultural commodity. The model allows the manufacturer to select an optimal number and set of farmers to contract with, while determining how supplies generated from the contracts are optimally distributed to meet the demands of each of the manufacturer's production facilities. The manufacturer selects a set of farmers to offer a menu of contracts, which is exogenously specified or endogenously determined. The model is a Stackelberg game with asymmetric information, with the manufacturer as the leader and the selected farmers as the followers. A farmer, when selected, chooses the contract which maximizes his expected profit under an optimal irrigation scheme, by solving a two-stage stochastic program, possibly declining all contracts, if a minimum income level cannot be assured. The manufacturer uses the farmers' random supply quantities, under their best response strategies, to determine his farmer selection and end-of-the-season distribution plan, again by solving a stochastic program.
We have shown how both the farmers' and the manufacturer's problem can be solved to optimality and close to optimality, respectively, even when the number of potential suppliers is 1,000 or larger. To this end, we have developed two approximate solution methods and a Lagrangean dual lower bound. We also show how our model can be used to gain various managerial insights.
Salvage Value for the Manufacturer
In our base model, we have ignored the possibility of a salvage value p s for any unit of excess supply from the farmers' contracts, above and beyond the manufacturer's aggregate demand. Such a salvage value is easily incorporated, replacing the objective function (1) in (M ) by:
Within the M ILP approach of Appendix E.2, the additional term can be accommodated as follows:
Choose a three-point grid {d 0 < 0,
. . , K} to the M ILP with additional constraints:
and add the term −p s K k=1 δ k d 2 ζ 2k to the objective function of (46). The Greedy-Add or Greedy-Drop heuristics may, in principle, be applied, without any modification. Note however that, in contrast to g(Y ), the augmented set functiong(Y ) in (39) is no longer supermodular. To maintain supermodularity, the additional term −p s E[
Given the coverage constraint (2), this approximation is rather innocuous.
Correlations Among the Supply Quantities and the Spot Price
In our base model, we have assumed that the rainfall quantities {R i } are independent, so that the supply variables {S i } are independent as well. In reality, the rainfall quantities, in particular for farmers that are geographically close to each other, are positively correlated. Similarly, we have assumed that the supply quantities {S i } are independent with respect to the future spot price which is incorporated into the cost parameters {γ 0j , j = 1, . . . , J}.
A more realistic, yet still tractable model would represent the interdependence among these random variables as follows. Let R tot denote the total rainfall in the region, and specify
with {ρ i } a set of independent random variables and η > 0 a constant. Likewise,
for a given decreasing function Γ j that can be inferred from historical data. Replacing the independence assumption by the above statistical model impacts the solution method only in two places.
First, when evaluating the expectation in the second term of the objective functions (1) or (7) in (M ) or (M ), respectively, rather than drawing a sample from independent random variables {S i , D i , γ 0j }, one would draw these from the joint distribution resulting from the statistical model (40) and (41). In addition, one needs to adapt the coverage constraint. This requires calculating or estimating the covariances {cov(S i , S i ) : i = i } for every pair of potential farmers. (Estimation is, again, most easily performed on the basis of simulation.) As demonstrated in Federgruen and Yang (2008) , the following CLT-based approximation of the coverage constraint (2) can now be used:
where U denotes a random variable with a standard Normal distribution. It can again be shown that this chance constraint is equivalent to the following pair of constraints, replacing (8) and (9):
The Greedy-Add or Greedy-Drop heuristics can be applied, merely using the coverage constraint (42) instead of (8). As to the M ILP approach in Appendix E.2, various approaches may be used to transform the quadratic mixed integer program into a M ILP . Glover (1975) Online Appendix 
Appendix C: Perfect Information Case
Given the choice of very high cost parameters {γ 0j , j = 1, . . . , J} for procurement from an outside emergency source, it is, under perfect information, optimal, in any scenario, to choose a set of farmers whose aggregate supply covers the aggregate demand, assuming such a set exists. This implies that in the perfect information case, the coverage constraint (2) fails to be relevant, and can be omitted.
The formulation of the perfect information version of the problem requires the following notation: Assume there are K possible scenarios for the realizations of the random variables (i.e., assume all random variables have finite support). Let
• S ik = the supply volume provided by farmer i, under scenario k, as a best response to the offered menu of contracts, i = 1, . . . , I and k = 1, . . . , K
• D jk = the demand volume at the j th manufacturing plant, under scenario k, j = 1, . . . , J and k = 1, . . . , K
• Y ik = 1 if the manufacturer selects farmer i, under scenario k, i = 1, . . . , I, k = 1, . . . , K; and 0, otherwise.
• ν ijk = the number of units shipped from farmer i to manufacturing plant j, under scenario k, i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , J, and k = 1, . . . , K • δ k : the likelihood associated with scenario k, k = 1, . . . , K
The "perfect information" version of (M ) may then be formulated as:
The above formulation follows the sample average approximation method; see e.g., Kleywegt et al. (2001) .
This "perfect information" version of the problem thus reduces to the repeated solution of the deterministic version of (M ). This follows from the simple observation that (B.1) is completely decomposable by scenario. The deterministic version of (M ) is often referred to as a capacitated network design problem, and may also be viewed as a minimum concave cost network design problem, the NP-completeness of which was shown by Lozovanu (1983) . Nevertheless, solution of the deterministic problem, and hence of (P IM ) is considerably simpler than that of the stochastic program (M ). Large size instances are, routinely, solved with general purpose software for Mixed Integer LPs (M ILP ), for example CPLEX.
The optimal value of (P IM ) provides, of course, a lower bound for that of (M ), since the latter's space of feasible solutions is a subset of that of (P IM ). (A feasible solution of (P IM ) is feasible for (M ) if and only if it satisfies the additional constraints Y ik = Y i for all i = 1, . . . , I and k = 1, . . . , K, while the common selection variables {Y i } satisfy coverage constraint (2)). The solution of (P IM ) provides an interesting benchmark for (M ). It also reveals how much value may be attributed to having good forecasts of the various random input factors.
so is E(Ψ(Y )) by the fact that the expectation operator preserves supermodularity. The first term in (1) is a modular set function and, in particular, a supermodular function. Since supermodularity is also closed under summation, the complete objective function (1) is also supermodular as a function of (I\I * ).
Appendix E: The Manufacturer's Problem: Approximate Solution Methods
In this section, we develop approximate solution methods for the manufacturer's problem (M ) under a given menu of contracts. These fall into two broad categories covered in subsections E.1 and E.2, respectively. a) Constructive improvement heuristics: These are iterative methods in which, in each iteration, the current set of suppliers is modified by the addition or elimination of a supplier or the replacement of a supplier by one outside the current set. The method terminates if none of the relevant set perturbations results in a cost improvement.
b) Mathematical programming based heuristics
In Appendix F, we derive a lower bound for (M ) via the Lagrangean dual of one of its formulations; moreover we show how this Lagrangean dual can be computed efficiently.
E.1. Constructive Improvement Heuristics
The formulation of the stochastic program (M ) in (1)- (3), or its approximation (M ) in (7)- (10), projects the optimization problem onto {0, 1} I , the space of selection variables {Y i }. The vector Y specifies the set of selected farmers. We first show that the objective function g(Y ) in (1) is a supermodular set function. This means that for any pair of vectors
with e i the i th unit vector in R I . In other words, the addition of a new farmer to a given set of farmers results in a smaller expected cost saving, hence, a larger expected cost increase, compared to when the same farmer is added to a subset thereof. Appendix D shows the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The objective function of problem (M ) is a supermodular set function.
Supermodular set functions are important in the optimization and economics literature. For example, many fundamental problems in a variety of supply chain models, including network design problems, stochastic inventory problems, and pricing models can be posed as a problem of minimizing a supermodular set function.
(An example is the uncapacitated plant location problem, see Cornuejols et al. 1977) . This class of problems -even unconstrained-was shown to be NP-hard even if the evaluation of the set function can be performed in polynomial time, as is the case in our model, where it reduces to the solution of a series of independent transportation problems. The complexity results follow from the fact that the general class of problems generalizes many well-known NP-hard problems, including the special case discussed in Appendix C (with K = 1 scenarios) and the aforementioned uncapacitated plant location problem.
However, Cornuejols et al. (1977) and Nemhauser and Wolsey (1978) showed that, at least for the unconstrained (supermodular) set minimization problem, simple heuristics such as the greedy-add or greedy-drop heuristics work remarkably well. (The simplest version of the greedy-add heuristic starts from a feasible solution and adds, at each iteration, a single new element that results in the largest cost saving among all possible choices; the heuristic terminates when no addition of any outside element results in a cost decrease.
The greedy-drop heuristic starts with the full set of elements, and in each iteration, drops whatever element results in the smallest cost increase.) In numerical studies, these heuristics have performed remarkably well.
Moreover, Cornuejols et al. (1977) derives an impressive worst case optimality gap of e −1 ≈ 37%, albeit that a somewhat unconventional optimality gap measure is used. More recently, the theory has been generalized to include side constraints that are linear in the binary variables that describe the composition of the selected set; see Lee et al. (2009) and Kulik et al. (2013) .
Because of the fixed costs of engaging with the farmers, i.e., the first term in (1), g(Y ) is not a monotone function of the selected set of farmers, which makes solving this problem more complex (see Kulik et al. 2013 ). Nevertheless, these results bode well for the performance of similar constructive heuristics for our problem, as follows: Greedy-Add Heuristic, version 1: In this heuristic, we add, in each iteration, a new supplier to the current set of suppliers. As long as the coverage constraint fails to be satisfied, we add any supplier whose addition results in the smallest expected cost increase; in subsequent iterations, we execute the addition only if the resulting expected cost increment is negative, and terminate otherwise. As the initial set of suppliers, we select the solution to the perfect information problem (P IM ), see Appendix C, with a single scenario (K = 1) and all random variables {S i } and {D j } replaced by their expected values.
The determination of the initial set of suppliers reduces to the solution of a fairly simple Mixed Integer Linear Program (M ILP ). The complexity of the subsequent iterations is similar to that of the Greedy-Drop heuristic, i.e., it amounts to at most O(I 2 ) evaluations of the set function g(·) and the same number of tests whether the coverage constraint is satisfied.
Greedy-Add Heuristic, version 2: Identical to the previous heuristic, except for the selection of the initial set. In this version, a sample of K scenarios is generated for the joint distribution of all {S i } and {D j } variables. The full (P IM ) problem is solved and the suppliers selected in at least α% of the K scenarios become part of the initial set S o . In other words, farmer i ∈ S o if and only if
optimal solution to (P IM ).
E.2. A Mixed Integer Programming Method
The manufacturer's problem (M ), i.e., the problem of minimizing (7), subject to (8) (8) is replaced by a piecewise linear approximation. Note that by (9) and (10): 
along with so-called SOS2 constraints to ensure that at most two of the η-variables are nonzero and that these non-zero variables have consecutive indices. As before, we employ the sample averaging method to evaluate the second term in (45).
The full formulation of the M ILP is thus given by: 
Appendix F: Lower Bound Computation -Lagrangean Dual
In this appendix, we derive a lower bound for the manufacturer's problem, (M ), which can be computed with modest effort even for large size problem instances, with hundreds or thousands of farmers. The lower bound is obtained by dualizing the constraints (8) and (10) with Lagrange multipliers λ ≥ 0 and −∞ < ρ < ∞. We then obtain the following Lagrangean dual of the manufacturer's problem:
For any fixed pair of Lagrange multipliers λ and ρ, the Lagrangean relaxation decomposes into an optimization problem in the vector of Y and a separate problem in the single continuous variable Y E . In particular,
for fixed λ and ρ, we can write
where 
F.2. Solution Methods for
It is well known and easily verified that the function z * (λ, ρ) is jointly concave in (λ, ρ); however, as the optimal value of a mixed integer program, it fails to be differentiable everywhere. Nevertheless, a steepest ascent subgradient method can be employed to find the maximizing pair of Lagrange multipliers (λ * , ρ * ).
However, to ensure convergence, very small step sizes need to be chosen in the steepest ascent method.
We have observed that the following tâtonnement scheme converges considerably faster: at odd (even) numbered iterations, the scheme fixes the last obtained value of ρ (λ) and finds the corresponding optimal value of λ (ρ) via a standard bisection method. (In view of the joint concavity of the function z * (λ, ρ), the tâtonnement scheme is guaranteed to converge to an optimum solution.)
Solving the Lagrangean dual z D generates a very useful lower bound against which various heuristics may be benchmarked. In addition, the optimal solution vector Y * (λ * , ρ * ) in the Lagrangean relaxation (48) provides another promising initial set of farmers to start the Greedy-add heuristic with.
Appendix G: Numerical Analysis: Scenario Generation
The potato chips manufacturer contracts with several thousands of farmers located in 19 districts across six states of India. (India is divided into 36 states or territories each of which is subdivided into districts.)
Indian farmers are typically very small. Table 1 in Singh et al. (2002) shows that in 1991, country-wide, a total of 165.6 million hectares were cropped, by no less than 106.6 million farmers. (The total cropped area barely grew between 1971 and 1991; however, the number of farmers grew from 70.5 million in 1971 to 106.6 million in 1991. This, of course, implies that the average farm size decreased significantly in this time span.)
The table partitions the farms into five categories, according to the size of the cropped area: sub-marginal, marginal, small, medium, and large farms.
We only had access to aggregate data for the 19 districts, rather than data for each of the contracted or potential farmers. When generating our problem instances, we assumed that the manufacturer only considered small, medium, and large farms, which, nationwide, represent 41% of all farms. We assumed that the distribution of farm sizes among the list of potential farms, in each district, reflected the national distribution as in Table A .1 in Appendix A. For any given farmer, in any of the districts, we therefore assigned a land size that is drawn, independently, from this national three-point distribution.
G.1. Geographic distribution of the farmers
We were given data for the total contracted cropped area in each district, for the years 2009-2010. For any problem instance with I country-wide potential farmers, we distributed them across the 19 districts in proportion to the districts' average cropped area in the above two calendar years. (The resulting district numbers were adjusted by a factor uniformly chosen from the interval [0.9, 1.1] and then rounded to the nearest integer.)
G.2. The farmer's supply quantity distribution
In terms of the yield functions, f i (α i , T i ), we chose structure 1 see (12), specified as follows:
Λ i = the land size of farmer i (in hectares),
I is = 1, if farmer i is located in state s, s = 1, . . . , 6; i = 1, . . . , I 0, otherwise and β > 0 is a non-negative parameter, while {α 1 , . . . , α 6 } are random variables. Thanks to data provided by the Columbia Water Center, we had access to a 100-year time series, for each of the 19 districts, of the total rainfall (in millimeters -mm) over the course of the 90 day growing season. We assumed that each farmer experiences a random rainfall quantity generated from a Normal distribution whose mean and standard deviation match the 100-year distribution pertaining to the district the farmer resides in. The Center also 
We estimated the distributions of the six state specific intercepts {α s : s = 1, . . . , 6} and the value of the slope β by running a regression based on the 38 observations of supply volumes per district, for a unit Table A.3 in Appendix A; they show significant differences in the farm productivity across the six states, with Uttar Pradesh roughly 2.5 times as productive as the state of Karnataka. In our problem instances, we assigned to each farmer i, the yield function f i (·, ·) in (50), with an α-value drawn from a five-point distribution,
anchored on a Normal distribution with mean and standard deviation given by the estimated mean µ s and standard error σ s of the α−parameter pertaining to the state in which the farmer resides. (The five-point distribution used the values {µ s − 2σ s , µ s − σ s , µ s , µ s + σ s , µ s + 2σ s } as its support, with probabilities {Φ −1 (−1.5), Φ −1 (−0.5) − Φ −1 (−1.5), Φ −1 (0.5) − Φ −1 (−0.5), Φ −1 (1.5) − Φ −1 (0.5), 1 − Φ −1 (1.5)} to match the underlying distribution; a discrete distribution was used to be consistent with our model assumption of finitely many farmer types.)
In this numerical study, we assumed that the farmer's intercept value α is his private information while the manufacturer only knows the distribution from which it is drawn. No other sources of asymmetric information are assumed. For the slope β, we uniformly used the number β = 0.0009, which corresponds to the lower point of the 95% confidence interval of the estimate of this parameter.
G.3. The farmer's cost parameters and menu of contracts
We obtained state-specific values for the cost parameters c i , the variable cost of producing a metric ton (MT) of potatoes, exclusive of irrigation costs, and the irrigation cost per cubic meter of water. The former cost value includes the cost of seeds, planting, ploughing, fertilizers, plant protection chemicals, harvesting, and packing costs.
We specified a menu of contracts, differentiated by state and farm size category. (This represents a total of 18 menus.) Each menu is characterized by a linear price-quantity relationship. The menus were constructed as follows: For each state s, we were given the average price, p s , paid per MT of potatoes, as well as the average quantity, q s , procured per hectare. As an example, consider the contract menu for small farmers:
The point (p s , 1.43q s ) was selected as the midpoint on the menu, since an average small farmer has a land size of 1.43 hectare, see Table A .1. When quantities are displayed on the X−axis and prices on the vertical Y −axis, the line with slope −3/2 was drawn through this point, and 5 equidistant points were selected on either side of the midpoint. For the "medium" and "large" farmers, the same procedure was used except that the midpoint was selected as (p s , 2.76q s ) and (p s , 7.95q s ), reflecting their respective land sizes, see Table   A .1, and the slope of the contract line as -1 and −3/5, respectively.
G.4. The manufacturer's demands and transportation costs
The manufacturer has three production facilities. In our study, we drew the product demands in these facilities from a Normal distribution with a coefficient of variation of 0.15. For each problem instance, we generated a "high demand version" and "low demand version" in which the expected aggregate demand is specified as 65%
and 50% of the aggregate supply across all I potential suppliers, respectively, assuming each farmer supplies the quantity corresponding with the midpoint of his contract line. Finally, we generated transportation cost rates {γ ij } by multiplying a given average cost rate per MT per mile, with the relevant, Google Maps calculated, road distance between the centroid of the farmer's district and the relevant production facility.
When evaluating the set function g(Y ) in the manufacturer's problem, see (1), we evaluated the second term in (1) by drawing a sample of 100 {S i , D j : i = 1, . . . , I j = 1, . . . , J} vectors. To solve each of the farmer problems, we drew a sample of 10,000 realizations for the vectors {R i , C i }, when evaluating each of the possible contracts in the offered menu, see problem (F ) and equation (18).
All reported computation times refer to a laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3537U CPU @ 2.00 GHz and 2.50 GHz processor, 8GB RAM and 64-bit Windows operating system.
